I Paid Attention to Reporter Before He Broke NSA Story

Published in The Guardian last week, reporter Glenn Greenwald’s exclusive report about the National Security Agency’s domestic surveillance and data collection scandal will, perhaps, go down in history as the biggest story of his journalistic lifetime.  It was, however, Greenwald’s work many years earlier that caught my attention.

Greenwald Guardian NSA Story 6-6-13In my new book, THE CLAPPER MEMO, I dedicate an entire chapter to dissecting a slanted news report spearheaded by former ABC News Chief Investigative Correspondent Brian Ross and broadcast March 30, 2006, during a segment of the network’s Primetime program.

I not only point out how wrong Ross was in his reporting about an investigative technology that competes with polygraph but is banned for use by Department of Defense, but I also highlight some of Greenwald’s work that has been critical of Ross.  Specifically, I point readers to a Salon.com article published April 9, 2007, under the headline, “The unresolved story of ABC News’ false Saddam anthrax report.”

Below is an excerpt from Chapter 14 of THE CLAPPER MEMO:

Writing for Salon.com, Glenn Greenwald devoted much time and attention to coverage of news reports by Ross about an alleged link between post-9/11 Anthrax attacks in the United States and Iraq.

At one of the most critical times in American history, the weeks following the 9/11 and anthrax attacks, Greenwald wrote in an April 2007 article, ABC News and Brian Ross published multiple, highly inflammatory reports, aggressively linking Iraq to the anthrax attacks, which turned out to be completely false.

It has yet to be proven whether or not Greenwald has been spot-on when it comes to the NSA scandal, but I can tell you he was spot-on when it came to Ross.

Of course, that’s just a snippet of what appears in THE CLAPPER MEMO, the product of an exhaustive four-year investigation in which I connect the dots between three DoD memos — including one issued by James R. Clapper Jr. before he became Director of National Intelligence (i.e., our nation’s top intelligence official) — and hundreds of American and Coalition Forces casualties resulting from “Green-on-Blue” or “Insider” attacks in Afghanistan.

I hope you’ll buy it and read it soon.

THE CLAPPER MEMO is available in paperback and ebook versions at Amazon.

WARNING:  Your blood will boil with anger when you read THE CLAPPER MEMO.

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Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August and THE CLAPPER MEMO. To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

Increase in ‘Insider Attacks’ Follows Deployment of Portable Polygraph Units to Afghanistan

In 2007, officials with the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan began keeping track of “Insider Attack” or (a.k.a., “Green-on-Blue”) casualties.  That same year, James R. Clapper Jr. — the man now serving as Director of National Intelligence, our nation’s top intelligence official — issued a memo in which he declared the polygraph the only authorized credibility assessment tool for use by Department of Defense personnel.  One year later, Pentagon officials deployed the Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (a.k.a., “PCASS”) to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Fig 5 Insider Attacks on ISAF Personnel

Published late last year in the Department of Defense 2012 Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Fig. 5 above shows how the number of Insider Attacks was low through 2007 and 2008 and then increased in 2009 and during each year since Pentagon officials deployed the portable polygraph devices overseas.

ISAF PCASS Story on Facebook 5-14-13Though PCASS was initially touted as a tool to be used for credibility assessment purposes, Pentagon officials gave it zero public attention after the date it was introduced.  Then, barely two weeks after publication of my second nonfiction book, THE CLAPPER MEMO, ISAF officials used a status update (see graphic above) on their organization’s Facebook page to describe it as a “key component” against “Insider threats.”  It seemed as if they were trying to push back against the book, and it wasn’t the first time they had fought someone challenging their version of “the status quo.”

You can learn more about the findings of my exhaustive four-year investigation and what’s causing DoD officials to push back against them by ordering a copy of and reading THE CLAPPER MEMO.  Already endorsed by three heavyweight Americans, it’s available in paperback and ebook versions at Amazon.

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Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August and THE CLAPPER MEMO. To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

‘Key Component’ Against ‘Insider Threats’ Called Into Question

Using only a Facebook status update, International Security Assistance Force officials in Afghanistan whispered to the world that a portable polygraph device deployed to that stone-age country in 2008 is a “key component” against “insider threats.”  Such a pronouncement offers little solace to the hundreds of American and coalition forces troops who fell victim to attacks by their so-called Afghan “allies” during the past six years.  Among them are soldiers from my native Oklahoma, described in a Memorial Day article I read today:

Casket-FlagArmy Pfc. Jon R. Townsend, 19, of Claremore, was killed in an insider attack. He and three other soldiers were killed when an Afghan police officer fired on them while they responded to a checkpoint.

Army Staff Sgt. Rex L. Schad, 26, of Edmond, also died in an insider attack. Schad, another soldier and two Afghan police officers were killed when another Afghan policeman picked up a machine gun and fired on them.

If the portable polygraph devices mentioned in ISAF’s Facebook entry and known today as the Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System were truly effective at preventing the insider threat, Private Townsend, Sergeant Schad and many other Soldiers might still be alive today.

In my recently-released second nonfiction book, THE CLAPPER MEMO, I reveal the findings of an exhaustive four-year investigation that included interviewing several of our nation’s most-experienced interrogators, including members of the Army Green Berets and Navy SEALs, who used non-polygraph technology to successfully interrogate enemy combatants, suspected terrorists and infamous members of Saddam Hussein‘s inner circle, known as “The Deck of Cards.”

In addition, I spoke with a wide variety of law enforcement officials from across the United States about their use of non-polygraph technology as a tool during high-profile criminal investigations, including the Jessica Lunsford kidnapping-murder case in Florida.

Finally, I share never-before-published documents obtained from officials in charge of interrogation efforts at Guantanamo Bay.  They share startling findings about the decision Department of Defense officials made to take away their best investigative tool — and it wasn’t the polygraph.

Of course, I can’t reveal everything I discovered.  I can, however, tell you that THE CLAPPER MEMO has ranked as high as #3 in Amazon’s “Top 100 Hot New Releases in Terrorism” and as high as #15 in books on politics.  In addition, it has been endorsed by three heavyweight Americans.

THE CLAPPER MEMO is available in paperback or ebook versions at Amazon.

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Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August and THE CLAPPER MEMO. To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

McClatchy News Articles Highlight Polygraph Issues, Support Findings of New Book

Months after McClatchy News published reporter Marisa Taylor‘s series, The Polygraph Files, she continues to provide fodder that supports the findings I share in my recently-released second nonfiction book, THE CLAPPER MEMO.

McClatchy Poly Article 1 - 5-20-13

Click to read about polygraph favoritism.

In one piece published today in the Miami Herald, Taylor points out the close ties between polygraph loyalists inside and outside the federal government.  Among those mentioned in the article and in my book at the folks at Lafayette Instrument Company, the nation’s largest polygraph manufacturer, and at the American Polygraph Association, the world’s largest association of polygraph professionals.

In a second piece published in the same newspaper, Taylor points out a potentially-devastating glitch in the widely-used polygraph.

McClatchy Poly Article 2 - 5-20-13

Click to read about a polygraph glitch.

Both of Taylor’s findings support my contention that a win-at-all-cost “turf war” against any and all challengers to their technology has been waged by polygraph loyalists for more than 40 years against any.  Further, Taylor’s articles support my findings that the reliance of the federal government — and, in particular, the Department of Defense — on the polygraph has resulted in U.S. military and intelligence personnel facing higher-than-necessary risk of becoming casualties in places like Afghanistan.

I highly recommend you read all of Taylor’s reports mentioned above and, afterward, suggest you order a copy of my book, THE CLAPPER MEMO.  When you do, you’ll learn never-before-published details about the turf war and its connection to “Green-on-Blue” or “Insider” attacks in Afghanistan.

THE CLAPPER MEMO is available in paperback and ebook versions from Amazon.

RELATED NEWS

UPDATE 5/21/2013 at 11:34 a.m. Central:  The U.S. government has pledged $23 million to help improve security and fight drug trafficking and other crimes in the eastern Caribbean region.  Among other things, according to this report, the money will be used in part for training and to buy polygraph equipment.

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Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August and THE CLAPPER MEMO. To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

ISAF Officials Claim Portable Polygraph ‘Key Component’ Against ‘Insider Threats’

Imagine my surprise this morning when, less than two weeks after the release of my new book, THE CLAPPER MEMO, International Security Assistance Force officials issued public statements regarding the alleged effectiveness of portable polygraph devices in Afghanistan.

ISAF PCASS Story on Facebook 5-14-13

First known as the Portable Credibility Assessment Screening System and later changed to Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System, this portable polygraph technology was deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq for the first time in 2008.  One year later, DoD officials stonewalled me for nearly a month after I asked questions about the effectiveness of PCASS during its first year in operations.  The stonewalling led me to launch an investigation that would result in publication of THE CLAPPER MEMO early this month.

As of this posting, the ISAF announcement (shown in the graphic above and as text below) appears online only as a status update — but not as a news release, per se — published this morning on the ISAF Facebook page:

Screening System Partnership Helps Identify Insider Threats

KABUL, AFGHANISTAN (May 14, 2013) – A US Department of Defense screening tool that helps assess the truthfulness of individuals is being lauded as a key component of Afghan and US efforts to preemptively identify and neutralize potential insider threats.

In a program that began in late 2012, US Forces-Afghanistan is training Afghanistan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior personnel to use the Preliminary Credibility Screening System tool to assess people during security screenings.

The PCASS consists of physiological sensors, a small computer, specialized software and a testing procedure that can render an initial assessment of the truthfulness of individuals. Combined with other assessments, the PCASS significantly increases the ability to quickly identify potential threats before they act.

Two Afghan women from the MoI recently completed the training program, which expands the reach of the program by allowing female security personnel to screen female subjects while abiding by Afghan cultural custom.

Crucially, the announcement ignores the “elephant in the room” that is the hundreds of casualties resulting from “Green-on-Blue/Insider” attacks on U.S. and coalition troops during the past six years and, more precisely, during the five years since the initial deployment of 94 PCASS units to Afghanistan and Iraq at a reported cost of $7,500 each.  If PCASS works so well, why have so many of these attacks taken place?

In addition, the ISAF announcement ignores what I learned from interrogators with vast experience in hostile environments.

Rather than laud PCASS as ISAF officials have done, a Green Beret I interviewed shortly after his retirement from the Army told me Special Forces operators would “rather go back to the stubby pencil and taking an educated guess” than use PCASS.  In addition, the combat veteran — identified in the book only as “Joe” for security reasons — offered more words quite damning of PCASS which I share below in an excerpt from THE CLAPPER MEMO:

TheClapperMemoFrontCoverLR 6-5-13One of the major flaws in the technology that cause Joe and others to discount PCASS can be found in polygraph training, Joe said, that involves mock scenarios where subjects are given roles to play prior to undergoing a polygraph exam.

“If you can trick yourself into thinking you’re a bomber,” Joe said, referring to a 2006 PCASS study conducted at Fort Jackson, “then why can’t you trick yourself into thinking you’re not and trick that machine?”

Because Joe used an alternative to PCASS to set a record by conducting approximately 500 interrogations of enemy combatants, suspected terrorists, criminal suspects and third-country nationals seeking employment on U.S.-manned installations while he was stationed in Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar, I tend to believe him more than I do the many government bureaucrats with whom I spoke during the past four years.

I also tend to believe a former member of the Navy SEALs who spoke with me on the condition I not reveal his identity.  He cited the memo that deemed the polygraph the only authorized credibility assessment tool for use by DoD personnel — and inspired the title for my book — as a contributing factor in his decision to retire from the military much earlier than he could have.  And that wasn’t all he said.

When it comes to the bureaucrats who forced warfighters like him to stop using the non-polygraph alternative that had proven so effective in the field, he said they “should face charges and do time” for their actions.

RELATED:  Coincidence or not, this new development surfaced only five days after the Defense Intelligence Agency responded to a PCASS-related Freedom of Information Act request I submitted almost 10 months ago!

To learn the “rest of the story,” order a copy of THE CLAPPER MEMO in paperback or ebook versions from Amazon.

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Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August and THE CLAPPER MEMO. To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

FBI Agent Thrashes Polygraph During Senate Testimony

On Sept. 29, 1997, FBI Supervisory Special Agent (Dr.) Drew Campbell Richardson testified before members of a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary about the polygraph. Among other things, he described polygraph screening as being “completely without any theoretical foundation and has absolutely no validity.”

TheClapperMemoFrontCoverLR 6-5-13Upon discovering Richardson is not alone in his assessment, one must ask the question, “Why is the polygraph the only authorized credibility assessment technology for use within DoD when newer, proven-reliable technologies are available?”

I answer that question and many more in my newest nonfiction book, THE CLAPPER MEMO, the product of four years of extensive investigation.

Most importantly, however, THE CLAPPER MEMO exposes the flawed process via which Afghans are being vetted before being allowed to serve alongside U.S. and Coalition Forces troops as uniform-wearing members of Afghan military, police and security units. Those flaws have resulted in hundreds of U.S. and CF casualties, the result of “Green-on-Blue” or “Insider” attacks, during the past six years.

In addition, it highlights the fact that the polygraph, despite being the only credibility assessment tool allowed for use by DoD personnel, either (1) isn’t being used as part of that vetting process or, (2) isn’t working well if it is being used as part of the vetting process. Either way, American casualties continue to add up as a result.

You can order a copy of THE CLAPPER MEMO in paperback or ebook versions from Amazon.

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Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August and THE CLAPPER MEMO. To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

Gold Star Dad Speaks of Losing Son in ‘Green-on-Blue’ Attack

During four years of investigation leading to publication of my latest nonfiction book, THE CLAPPER MEMO, I focused much of my attention on the vetting process used to screen recruits before they serve alongside U.S. troops as uniform-wearing members of Afghan military, police and security units.  Why?  Because the flaws in that process have proven fatal for too many Americans, including Greg Buckley Jr.

In the video above, Gold Star Dad Greg Buckley Sr. of Oceanside, N.Y., talks about losing his son, a Marine lance corporal, in a “Green-on-Blue” or “Insider” attack in Afghanistan Aug. 10, 2012.

In THE CLAPPER MEMO, I reveal one of the reasons why so many of those attacks have taken place and uncover background material dating back more than 40 years to support my conclusions.

To find out what I learned, order a copy of THE CLAPPER MEMO, now available in paperback and ebook versions at Amazon.  FYI:  It comes highly recommended.

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Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August and THE CLAPPER MEMO. To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

Preventable ‘Green-on-Blue’ Attack Kills Two American Soldiers in Afghanistan

According to an Associated Press report today, two Americans died when an Afghan National Army soldier turned his weapon on coalition troops in the western part of the country.  Had that Afghan soldier been properly vetted before being allowed to serve alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan, I contend, those two Americans might still be alive today.  I back up that contention in my just-released nonfiction book, THE CLAPPER MEMO, the product of an exhaustive four-year investigation.

TCM Graphic 2-17-13In THE CLAPPER MEMO, I back up my contention, in part, by connecting the dots between three DoD memos– including one signed by James R. Clapper before he assumed the role as the nation’s top intelligence official — and the so-called “Green-on-Blue” or “Insider” attacks in Afghanistan.  More details in these posts.

For the complete story, order a copy of THE CLAPPER MEMO in paperback or ebook versions from Amazon.

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Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August and THE CLAPPER MEMO. To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

Report: Afghans Remember ‘Green-on-Blue’ Attacker as Hero; Vetting Process Fatally Flawed

The writer of a BBC article published this week details how citizens of one Afghan community posthumously regard one young man as a hero for having killed two British soldiers in a so-called “Green-on-Blue” or “Insider” attack.  What the writer fails to report about the cold-blooded killer is that the process via which he was allegedly vetted before being allowed to serve as a uniform-wearing member of the Afghan Border Police, is fatally flawed.

TheClapperMemoFrontCoverLR 6-5-13In my upcoming second nonfiction book, THE CLAPPER MEMO, I not only expose major flaws in the eight-step vetting process being used to vet Afghans before they are allowed to don their uniforms and work alongside Americans assigned to train and mentor them, but I trace the problem back almost ten years to the issuance of the first of three Department of Defense memos.  All three memos deemed the polygraph the only credibility assessment technology approved for use by agency employees (i.e., military and intelligence personnel).  One was issued by James R. Clapper Jr., now our nation’s top intelligence official.

Read more details about the book by clicking on BASICS.

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Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August and THE CLAPPER MEMO. To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

Changes in Field Ops Ignore Long-Term Fix in Afghanistan

Rather than implement a broader solution, Gen. John Allen, commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, has resorted to a short-term approach to reduce the number of so-called “Green-on-Blue” (a.k.a., “Insider”) attacks.

According to news reports like the one shown in the video above, General Allen has suspended most joint field operations in Afghanistan as a measure to combat the growing problem of attacks by members of the Afghan National Security Force against U.S. and coalition troops.  Wanting to find out more-specific details about what has been ordered, I fired off an email to my ISAF public affairs contact in Kabul.

In a message sent Monday at 2:57 p.m. Central, I asked Air Force Maj. Lori Hodge to “confirm or deny reports that ISAF troops have been ordered to separate from their Afghan counterparts.  If confirmed, please provide details ASAP.”  Eight hours later, I received the response below:

Sir,

ISAF continually conducts threat assessments and adapts to the current operating environment.  Recent events outside of and inside Afghanistan related to the ‘Innocence of Muslims’ video plus the conduct of recent insider attacks have given cause for ISAF troops to exercise increased vigilance and carefully review all activities and interactions with the local population.

General Allen has directed all operational commanders to review force protection and tactical activities in the light of the current circumstances.  This guidance was given at the recommendation of, and in conjunction with, key Afghan leaders.

This will likely lead to adjustments in exactly how, when and where ISAF troops operate, especially during the current period of heightened tension. These changes will often be short notice and reactive to the latest information.  ISAF remains focused on the continued conduct of effective combined operations with our Afghan partners to achieve the mission.  Those operations will always be conducted in a manner that mitigates risks to our troops but ensures mission success.

The commander of the ISAF Joint Command directed a change in the level at which advising and partnering takes place.  Most partnering and advising will now be at the Kandak (Battalion) level and above.  This does not mean there will be no partnering below that level; the need for that will be evaluated on a case by case basis and approved by RC commanders.  In some cases, ANSF are fully capable of increased independent activity and their advisors will simply be stepping back to advise from the next level.

TheClapperMemoFrontCoverLR 6-5-13While the approach outlined above will likely reduce the number of deaths and injuries during the short term, only a long-term solution will fix the problem.  In my soon-to-be released second nonfiction book, THE CLAPPER MEMO, I’ll share stunning details about that long-term solution and about the people — inside and outside the Department of Defense — doing their best to prevent that solution from being employed.

THE CLAPPER MEMO is set to be released this fall.

UPDATE 9/19/2012 at 8:03 a.m. Central:  It seems the ISAF Public Affairs folks offered a slightly-different spin on this subject on their website yesterday.

ISAF clarifies information on partnering with ANSF

2012-09-CA-14

KABUL, Afghanistan (Sept. 18, 2012) — Recent media coverage regarding a change in ISAF’s model of Security Force Assistance (SFA) to the Afghan National Security Forces is not accurate. ISAF remains absolutely committed to partnering with, training, advising and assisting our ANSF counterparts. The ISAF SFA model is focused at the battalion level and above, with exceptions approved by senior commanders. Partnering occurs at all levels, from Platoon to Corps. This has not changed.

In response to elevated threat levels resulting from the “Innocence of Muslims” video, ISAF has taken some prudent, but temporary, measures to reduce our profile and vulnerability to civil disturbances or insider attacks. This means that in some local instances, operational tempo has been reduced, or force protection has been increased. These actions balance the tension of the recent video with force protection, while maintaining the momentum of the campaign.

We’ve done this before in other high tension periods, and it has worked well. Under this guidance, and as conditions change, we will continue to adapt the force posture and force protection. The SFA model is integral to the success of the ANSF, and ISAF will return to normal operations as soon as conditions warrant.

NOW AVAILABLE!

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Bob McCarty is the author of two nonfiction books, Three Days In August: A U.S. Army Special Forces Soldier’s Fight For Military Justice (Oct ’11) and THE CLAPPER MEMO (May ’13).