Nineteen days ago, I shared details about Defense Intelligence Agency officials shirking federal law by allowing a Freedom of Information Act request of mine to languish 16 months. Today, I share proof that documents I requested almost 17 months ago — but have not received — do indeed exist.
Inside an article published over the weekend, I found a link to USASpending.gov, a site set up as a result of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 which required the Office of Management and Budget to establish a single searchable website, accessible to the public at no cost, which includes for each federal award. Once there, I entered “Lafayette Instrument Company” in the search box near the upper-right corner of the webpage and clicked the “Search” button.
Why Lafayette Instrument? Because, via the FOIA request I submitted to DIA officials July 16, 2012, I am seeking copies of unclassified documents involving that Lafayette, Ind.-based company as described in the paragraph below:
“…copies of any and all initial and follow-up contracts (i.e., solicitations, contracts, statements of work and task orders) related to the Portable Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS) or Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS) that have been awarded by any Department of Defense Agency to Lafayette Instrument Company of Lafayette, Indiana, and any other contractors, academic institutions, laboratories and subcontractors from January 1, 2000, to present.”
It’s obvious, by looking at the contract data shown in the search results for “Lafayette Instrument Company,” that at least four PCASS-related contracts were issued (see below) on Dec. 15, 2000, April 15, 2003, Dec. 14, 2005, and Oct. 5, 2006.
Why all four of the search results show obligations amounts of $0 is not so obvious. But I digress. The more-important question after discovering this online evidence is this: Why is DIA stonewalling me on the release of unclassified copies of contract-related information regarding the portable polygraph system known as PCASS? Makes me wonder if they have something to hide.
Stay tuned to see how this turns out.
Meanwhile, you can find out what DIA officials and others were unable to hide about the federal government’s use of credibility assessment technologies, including the polygraph, in my latest nonfiction book, THE CLAPPER MEMO. The product of my exhaustive four-year investigation, it’s available in paperback and ebook versions and has been ENDORSED by several high-profile Americans who understand the implications of my findings.
CORRECTION: The date shown in the third paragraph of this piece was entered inaccurately and has been corrected.